Introduction
What I hope to achieve in this paper is some rather deeper understanding of the semantic and pragmatic properties of utterances which are said to involve the phenomenon of metalinguistic negation. According to Larry Horn, who has been primarily responsible for drawing our attention to it, this is a special non-truthfunctional use of the negation operator, which can be glossed as 'I object to U' where U is a linguistic utterance. This is to be distinguished from descriptive truthfunctional negation which operates over a proposition.
The distinction is illustrated by example (1), with the two possible follow-up clauses given in (a) and (b):
(1) We didn't see the hippopotamuses.
a. We saw the rhinoceroses. b.
We saw the hippopotami.
The idea is that in the case of the (a) follow-up clause we have the standard truthfunctional negation and the utterance is descriptive of some aspect of the world. The negative statement and the following clause are consistent with one another: there is one set of creatures in the world that we didn't see and there is another, different, set of creatures that we did see. The propositional structure is 'not P; Q'. In the (b) case, on the other hand, such a descriptive understanding would lead to a contradiction, since we would be saying of the very same set of creatures both that we didn't see them and that we did see them, i.e 'not P; P'. But (1) followed by (b) is not, of course, understood in this way. It is taken to be communicating an objection to some property of the representation falling within the scope of the negation, some property other than its truth-conditional semantic content, in this case the particular manifestation of the plural morphology of the word 'hippopotamus'. A range of cases is given in (2), representative of the examples standardly cited in the literature (see Horn 1985 , 1989 , Burton-Roberts 1989a , 1989b :
(2) a.
We don't eat tom [a:t{uz] here, we eat tom [eiD{uz] . b.
He isn't neurotic OR paranoid; he's both. c.
I haven't DEPRIVED you of my lecture on negation; I've SPARED you it. d.
She's not my mother; she's my female progenitor. e.
The President of New Zealand ISn't foolish; there IS no President of New Zealand.
This gives some idea of the sorts of properties that might be objected to by this use of negation: the pronunciation of a word in (2a), the insufficient strength of the lexical item used in (2b), 1 a non-truth-conditional aspect of the semantics of a word in (2c), 2 the stereotypic assumptions or connotations that come with a particular word in (2d), an existential 'presupposition' carried by a sentence/utterance in (2e). This is summed up by Horn (1989, 363) : '[metalinguistic negation is] a device for objecting to a previous utterance on any grounds whatever, including the conventional or conversational implicata it potentially induces, its morphology, its style or register, or its phonetic realization.' This statement is quite typical: while 'any grounds whatever', might seem to include truth-conditional content (believing someone's utterance to be false is a good ground for objecting to it), it is always followed up by a list which does not include it. Most people seem to assume that since descriptive negation deals with truth-conditional content, this other kind of negation, used to register an objection, need not and does not. I shall return to this matter in section 5. So we have two uses of the negation operator; the question is whether the distinction between them is to be captured pragmatically, or is a semantic matter. Horn wrestles with the issue of how to characterise the relationship between these two ways of interpreting a negation; he insists that it does not amount to a semantic ambiguity, an ambiguity within the linguistic system itself, and calls it a pragmatic ambiguity, a 'built-in duality of use', which extends to other linguistic operators such as 'if', 'or' and 'and' (see Horn 1989, 379-382) . However, in the absence of any further specification the concept of 'pragmatic ambiguity' is at best hopelessly vague. A number of writers have puzzled over what it might be taken to mean (Burton-Robert 1989b , Foolen 1991 , van der Sandt 1991 , without reaching any concrete conclusions.
Horn himself is inconsistent in his discussion, writing of 'an extended metalinguistic use of a basically truth-functional operator' (Horn 1985, 122) , followed soon after by reference to 'this special or marked use of negation, irreducible to the ordinary internal truth-functional operator' (Horn 1985, 132) . Despite his avowals to the contrary, it seems to me that Horn's is essentially a semantic ambiguity position, one which in fact involves a two-fold ambiguity. There is an ambiguity in the negation operator itself: the one is the logical, truth-value reversing, negation, the other is a non-truth-functional operator expressing objection. And the further ambiguity lies with the nature of the material falling in the scope of the negation, whether it is a proposition or an utterance. This is unsatisfactory on at least two counts: first, intuitions are violated by the idea that 'not' itself is ambiguous, and second, there is an odd redundancy in this double ambiguity. I hope to dispel the air of mystery that surrounds this issue of the two uses/senses of negation and how they are related to each other, but first let us take a look at some of the features cited as typical of metalinguistic negation.
The last property is, in my view, the only one of the five which is essential to this use of negation. The other characteristics listed are not necessary properties and their frequent, though by no means inevitable, occurrence arises as a consequence of the metarepresentational nature of the material in the scope of the negation, a property which lends itself to certain special rhetorical effects. At least, this is what I wish to show. I will look now at a number of examples which demonstrate the inessential nature of these other properties.
Consider example (3); the first line is the text on the front of a birthday card, the next two lines are the text inside:
(3) This Birthday Card is NOT from one of your admirers.
-
Happy Birthday from both of us. (Horn 1992) The idea is, of course, to deliberately mislead the receiver, who first reads the front, into taking it descriptively; then when the card is opened and the message inside is read the descriptive understanding is recognised as mistaken and there is a reanalysis in terms of the metalinguistic use. So, certainly, property C is realised here, the extra processing effort required giving rise to the extra (mildly humorous) effects as relevance theory would predict. However, the supposedly typical accent pattern is not in evidence; as a written message the contradiction contour cannot be indicated and the stress pattern reflected in the upper case letters does not contrast the offending item 'one' with its replacement 'two'. As Chapman (1993) points out, this clue to the metalinguistic interpretation is deliberately withheld in order to ensure the gardenpathing and reanalysis. Furthermore, there is clearly no utterance to which this one is a rejoinder, and Horn's suggested gloss for metalinguistic use: 'I object to the utterance "this birthday card is from one of your admirers"', is very strained here. In fact, the absence of these first two properties is quite typical of those cases which involve a contrived garden-path; giving the hearer/reader such clues would only undermine the trick. So is the garden-pathing property central to the nature of metalinguistic negation? There is good reason to suppose not. Consider the examples in (4), where I have made the simple move of reversing the order of the negative clause and the socalled correction clause, so that what the hearer accesses and processes first has changed: (4) a.
Maggie's patriotic AND quixotic; not patriotic OR quixotic. b.
I've SPARED you my lecture; I haven't DEPRIVED you of it. c.
It's downright HOT out there, it's not WARM.
The correction clause is now (part of) the context in which the negative clause is processed. This shouldn't make any difference to the metalinguistic character of the utterances; a speaker of (4a) is objecting to someone's affirmative utterance that 'Maggie is patriotic or quixotic' just as much as a speaker of the clauses in the other order. Similarly, if the one order makes for a logical contradiction so must the other: if understood descriptively, what a speaker of (4a) would be taken to be communicating would be that Maggie has two properties, F and G, and that she has neither of these properties, F and G. But, and this is the point, there is surely no double processing of the negative utterance here; the metarepresentational nature of 'patriotic OR quixotic' is recognised straight off as such, without a preliminary stage of assuming a descriptive use. The first clause prepares the way for it, making it clear to the hearer that the speaker does not dispute the truth-conditional content that Maggie is patriotic or quixotic, since she has just made the stronger assertion that entails it. The negative clause will be processed on its first pass as a case of metalinguistic use. The same goes for (4b) and (4c).
The second sort of case where metalinguistic negation is noticed straight off is when something is explicitly marked as quotational. In written language we have an obvious way of doing this: the use of quotation marks, as in (5) You didn't see two "mongeese"; you saw two mongooses.
Surely when these are physically present as they are here, a reader does not first understand the material within the marks descriptively/truth-conditionally and only give up on that when he encounters a contradiction. Similarly, though less determinately, in a spoken case, the contradiction contour and the focal stress provide a hearer with clues which may direct him straight to the metalinguistic interpretation. As we saw above with example (3), when a speaker or writer is intent on gardenpathing a hearer or reader, these clues are likely to be withheld. Given the highly context-sensitive nature of utterance interpretation it is reasonable to suppose that there is a third sort of case which does not require two interpretations, the case where a particular context makes the metalinguistic interpretation immediately accessible. In such a case a follow-up correction clause is unnecessary: (6) [context: A and B have a running disagreement about the correct plural of "mongoose", A advocating "mongeese" and B "mongooses".] A: We saw two mongeese at the zoo. B: Now, come on, you didn't see two monGEESE.
In the context given, A might well recognise on a first pass the non-descriptive nature of the utterance with its implicated correction of the plural morphology of 'mongoose'. If their dispute is still sufficiently alive in his mind he may have produced his own utterance as a deliberate provocation and be anticipating B's response.
Most of the cases presented in the literature are abstracted from contextual specifics and, as they are in written form, they have few of the typical accentuation features which function as clues towards a metalinguistic reading, so we cannot make a blanket generalisation about how they are processed. In this regard, metalinguistic negatives are no different from metalinguistic affirmatives:
You may have seen some mongeese but as far as I'm concerned I saw some mongooses. b.
In America they eat tom[eiD{uz]; here we eat tom[a:t{uz].
These, too, may first be processed as descriptive and then, if they 'self-destruct', be reanalysed as metalinguistic, or they may be recognised immediately as metalinguistic, depending on the hearer/reader's most accessible context. So metalinguistic use need not be disguised or initially misleading as in some of the earlier cases; it may be plain to see from the beginning. If so, the processing effort it requires and the effects achieved will be rather different from that of the 'double processing' cases. If I am right that the reverse order examples in (4) are recognised as metalinguistic on a first pass, relevance theory would predict that, since they require less processing effort than the standard Horn cases, they should give rise to fewer, or at least different, effects. Intuitively, at least, this seems correct.
The examples in (4), (5) and (6) show that the understanding of a negation as metalinguistic need not involve garden-pathing, though (4) and (5) ARE logical contradictions when taken descriptively. Burton-Roberts (1989a , 1989b has emphasised this property, specifically motivated by his commitment to a presuppositional semantics for natural language.
Before considering the presupposition-denying cases let us consider whether metalinguistic cases are generally descriptive contradictions. I didn't put him up; I put up with him.
These examples are obviously quite consistent when taken descriptively and I do not see any reason to suppose they wouldn't be interpreted as metalinguistic; that is, as objections to some property of a previous utterance. In all three the focus of the objection is a property of linguistic form although it also happens to make a difference to truth-conditional content. However, opinion is divided at this point. Kempson (1986, 84) and Foolen (1991, 222) assume that these are (at least potentially) cases of metalinguistic use and Horn (1989, 403) himself gives similar non-contradictory examples of metalinguistic negation. Burton-Roberts (1989a , 1989b , on the other hand, excludes these from being cases of metalinguistic negation precisely because they are not logical contradictions. His claim is that contradictoriness is the single unifying property of all cases of metalinguistic negation and that it is this that provides the rationale for the pragmatic reanalysis which these cases inevitably, according to him, undergo. However, it is not entirely clear what the contradictoriness claim amounts to when we consider a further sample of cases standardly cited, by Horn, Burton-Roberts and others, as metalinguistic negations:
He didn't eat THREE of the cakes; he ate FOUR. b.
They didn't fall in love and get married; they got married and fell in love. c.
semantics: not [P & Q]; Q & P first pass pragmatic processing: not [P & then Q]; Q & then P
On the most widely accepted (linguistic) semantic analysis of (9a) and (9b) they are indeed semantic contradictions (Horn 1985 , Kempson 1986 , Carston 1988 , BurtonRoberts 1989b . But it is far from obvious that they are contradictions in on-line processing; if much current work in pragmatics is on the right track then these examples standardly involve pragmatic enrichment at the level of the proposition expressed by the utterance (its truth-conditional content). This is demonstrated in (9c) for (9b): by the time the hearer reaches the end of the first clause he will have enriched the conjunctive relation to include temporal sequence so that the subsequent processing of the follow-up clause will not result in a contradiction. Similarly, the enrichment of 'three' to 'exactly three' in the left to right processing of (9a) will ensure that the first pass descriptive interpretation is consistent. This does not entail that 3 The enrichment of conjunction has been extensively discussed and motivated within Relevance Theory (see Blakemore (1987) , Carston (1988) , Wilson & Sperber (1993) ); the shift from a scalar implicature treatment of number cases to a pragmatic enrichment account has been discussed within Relevance Theory (Kempson 1986 , Carston 1988 ) and by Horn (1992) ). these will never be cases of metalinguistic use. In an appropriate context they might well be, but their interpretation as such won't be prompted by the derivation of a contradiction. 3 I shall argue that, in a certain sense, the 'presupposition'-denying cases are the mirror image of these, in that while they are not semantic contradictions, the interpretation made on a first pass does standardly result in a contradiction.
The 'presupposition'-denying cases
As already mentioned, cases such as those in (10), which involve a follow-up correction clause denying a presupposition carried by the affirmative counterpart of the first clause, are standardly included in the lists of metalinguistic negation examples:
(10) a.
The President of NZ isn't a fool; NZ hasn't got a President. b.
I haven't given up smoking; I've never smoked. c.
I don't regret telling her my secrets; I haven't told her anything.
They certainly feel similar to the other cases: they are most easily contextualised as rejoinders to an utterance of the affirmative, they are most readily uttered with the typical contradiction contour and they have the marked, garden-pathing effects that the other examples in (2) standardly have. Are they logical contradictions? On Burton-Roberts' account of presupposition as a semantic relation, intrinsic to the linguistic system, they must be. It follows from the definition of semantic presupposition that each of the negative sentences in (10) carries the presupposition of its affirmative counterpart. Therefore, in each case the follow-up clause contradicts the preceding negative sentence. It is this that prompts the pragmatic reanalysis in terms of a metalinguistic use of the negative element. Burton-Roberts' (1989a , 1989b analysis for (10a) is given in (11):
(11) semantics: [the P is not-F]; there is no P.
which is a contradiction pragmatic reanalysis: not['the P is F']; there is no P He argues that a unified account of metalinguistic negations (in terms of logical contradiction) and the semantic account of presupposition need each other. His line of reasoning is as follows:
These 'presupposition'-denying cases are standardly treated as cases of metalinguistic negation (by Horn, et al). It is only in a presuppositional semantics that these 'presupposition'-denying cases qualify as semantic contradictions (since, by definition, the negation operator of a presuppositional semantics preserves presuppositions. 4 ) (d) Therefore it is only on a presuppositional semantics that you get a unified account of metalinguistic negation (in terms of semantic contradiction forcing pragmatic reanalysis of the negation as metalinguistic).
Therefore the metalinguistic analysis of 'presupposition'-denying cases requires that presupposition be understood as a property of natural language semantics (as opposed to pragmatics).
First off, it is far from obvious that metalinguistic negations are generally logical contradictions, as we saw above. This is mere stipulation on Burton-Roberts' part.
Second, there appears to be considerable evidence scattered throughout the literature that the presupposition-denying cases themselves are not logical contradictions (see Kempson 1986 , Horn 1990 , Seuren 1990 ). In addition to that evidence which I will not review here, I would like to point to a sharp distinction between these presupposition-denying cases and the other metalinguistic cases. The very property that led to the standard metalinguistic cases being called 'paradoxical negations' does not seem to extend to the 'presupposition' cases. As Horn (1989, 431-2) , following Cormack (1980) points out, these negations seem to be paradoxical because their affirmative counterparts are entailed by their correction clauses; that is, given the schematic representation of these examples as 'Not P; Q', the following seems to be the case: 'Since/if Q, then P': The example in (12a) does not involve the negation operator but is included as a typical semantic contradiction; it is typical in that the second clause entails the negation of the first. The paradoxical negation cases evince the same property in that their follow-up clauses entail the affirmative counterpart of the negative clauses. However, applying the same procedure to the presupposition-denying cases, as in (12d) and (12e), gives nonsense, which is only to be expected since they precisely are not paradoxical/contradictory. This, in fact, jeopardises the entirety of Burton-Roberts' semantic presupposition position. Here, though, the point of immediate interest is that this provides further evidence against the general claim that metalinguistic negations are semantic contradictions. What, then, of the strong intuition that there is some tension, if not contradiction, between the first clause and the second, and that they do, frequently at least, require double processing? The analysis I argue for in Carston (forthcoming) involves an extension of the standard 'Gricean' analysis, long argued for by the anti-presuppositionalists, Wilson, Kempson, Grice, Atlas, Boer & Lycan.
(13) a.
semantics: not [the P is F]; there is no P (i.e. 'presupposition'-cancelling, wide-scope, uncommitted negation) b.
standard first pass pragmatic processing: [the P is not-F]; there is no P (i.e. pragmatic enrichment/narrowing in order to meet manner/quantity and/or relation maxims (consistency with optimal relevance expectations.)) c.
second pass pragmatic processing (reanalysis): either: not ['the P is F']; there is no P (i.e. metalinguistic negation) or:
not [the P is F]; there is no P (i.e. descriptive presupposition-cancelling negation) (13a) and (13b) give the standard Gricean analysis, on which there is no semantic relation of presupposition; the existential implication is derived pragmatically, either as an implicature or as an enrichment at the level of the proposition expressed, a narrowing of the scope of the negation operator. These first two levels have been assumed by the Griceans to capture adequately the two possibilities: the 'presupposition' cancelling and the 'presupposition' preserving. However, what is missing here, as Burton-Roberts points out, is any recognition of the marked, nonpreferred, status of the presupposition-cancelling interpretation and the extra effects it seems to achieve in communication. This is reflected in (13c), which involves a second try, a pragmatic reanalysis, prompted by the contradiction arrived at during the first pass. Note that the contradiction here is not the outcome of the linguistic semantics; it has been derived pragmatically and is therefore compatible with the evidence in (12). This reanalysis may take either of two forms depending on the specifics of context. The move to a metalinguistic interpretation is the most likely option. But there is, in principle, another possibility here, a 'return', as it were, to the descriptive, wide-scope, 'presupposition'-cancelling semantics. Certainly something akin to this latter process occurs in the garden-pathing examples in (14) There is, of course, nothing metalinguistic going on here. But a pragmatic REanalysis takes place as a result of the second clause in each case which is at odds with the temporal enrichment made on-line in processing the first clause. The reanalysis is one of undoing or repairing that first pass pragmatic enrichment. There is, then, as far as I can see, nothing inevitable about a metalinguistic analysis of the presupposition-denying cases, contrary to the Burton-Roberts view. So far, then, there are no tidy generalisations to be made about cases of metalinguistic negation: some, but not others, are rejoinders to previous utterances; some, but not others, are semantic contradictions; some, but not others, of those that are descriptive contradictions are garden-path utterances; some, but not others, of those that are not contradictory are garden-pathers; some, but not others, involve a correction clause which may follow or precede the negative clause.
There is an interesting subset of cases whose general form has become almost a set formula for achieving rhetorical effects. These have the following properties: (a) the correction clause follows the negative clause; (b) they are standardly logical contradictions; and (c) they standardly create a descriptive garden-path before the metarepresentational interpretation is derived. These examples are highly effective and so memorable, but they do not form a natural class, linguistically or pragmatically. To assume they do has as little validity as assuming that the examples in (14) somehow constitute a natural class of cases. These, too, are just instances of a much more general phenomenon, illustrated by the examples in (9): the process of pragmatic enrichment at the level of the proposition expressed. The examples in (14) happen to have the further property of having been designed, first to mislead and then to correct, for the sake of achieving some special effects.
The essential property: implicit echoic use
The correct generalisation about the metalinguistic cases is that the material in the scope of the negation operator, or some of it at least, is echoically used, in the sense of Sperber & Wilson (1986) , Wilson & Sperber (1988 , 1992 . A representation is used echoically when it reports what someone else has said or thought and expresses an attitude to it. Typical examples are given in (15): (15) a.
The obnoxious beady-eyed woman is my wife. b.
It's a lovely day for a picnic, indeed.
The speaker of (15a) might be using the definite description truth-conditionally but is even more likely to be attributing it to someone else and expressing an attitude to it, conceivably one of endorsement, but more likely one of dissociation/rejection. This latter possibility contains the crucial ingredients of ironic utterances: the (implicit) attribution of an opinion and the (implicit) expression of an attitude of dissociation from that opinion. Similarly, (15b) might be a description of a state of affairs in the world, but in the appropriate context it might be used echoically to recall an earlier utterance or attribute a thought or opinion to someone, and express one of a range of attitudes to it. As well as echoing thoughts or truth-conditional content speakers might echo aspects of linguistic form: (16) Both examples echo a particular pronunciation and a phrasal expression, with an attitude of rejection. That attitude is made explicit in (16a) by the use of negation and is left implicit in (16b). (16a) is, of course, one of the standard cases of metalinguistic negation. Note that in both of the examples in (15) and (16) 
It's not correct to say that you saw two 'mongeese'; you should say 'mongooses'.
(18) It's not eSOTeric; it's esoTERic. a.
Is her dissertation terribly eSOTeric? b.
Is the correct pronunciation eSOTeric or esoTERic? (example due to N. Burton-Roberts)
In reply to the question in (b), the speaker of (18) is explicitly quotational, as she obviously is in (17); the referent assigned to 'it' is 'the correct pronunciation'. As a reply to (a), on the other hand, (18) is implicitly echoic, the referent of 'it' being 'her dissertation'; this is one of the typical metalinguistic negation cases. As Sperber & Wilson (1986) point out with the case of irony, it is precisely the implicit nature of the echoic use which gives these their garden-pathing potential. It is interesting in this regard to look at their comments on example (115a) (their numbering):
(115) a. When all was over and the rival kings were celebrating their victory with Te Deums in the respective camps ... (Voltaire: Candide) "In fact (115a), like many of the best examples of irony, is a garden-path utterance, likely to cause the reader momentary processing difficulties later offset by appropriate rewards. One at first reads it as an ordinary assertion, is led to the absurd conclusion that both sides won, and only then reinterprets echoically. By leaving the echo implicit when the addition of some explicit material [as in (115d)] would have immediately put the reader on the right track, the author opens up a whole new line of interpretation. ...
(115) d. When the battle was over and the rival kings were doing what they described as celebrating their victory with Te Deums in their respective camps ... " Sperber & Wilson (1986, 242) This property of implicit echoic use, then, accounts quite straightforwardly for why it is that these 'metalinguistic' negations lend themselves to effective garden-pathing, though this is not, of course, an inevitable feature of either ironical utterances or these echoic negations. Analysis in terms of echoic use seems to account well also for two of the standard formal diagnostics of metalinguistic negation: the presence of positive polarity items in their scope and the failure of morphological negation to function metalinguistically:
Mary is sometimes late. b.
*Mary is ever late. c.
Mary isn't ever late. d.
Mary isn't sometimes late. (She's always late.)
The descriptive negation counterpart of (19a) is (19c), with the negative polarity item 'ever'. The presence of the positive polarity item 'sometimes' in (19d), however, is entirely to be expected once it is recognised that what is going on is the echoing of the affirmative which contains the PPI.
(20) a. She's not happy; she's ecstatic. b. *She's unhappy; she's ecstatic. Horn (1989, 392 ) discusses this failure of metalinguistic negation to incorporate morphologically. He finds it understandable because, as he puts it in one of his few allusions to the quotational nature of metalinguistic negation, the negation operator is functioning 'on a different level from the rest of the clause'. More precisely, the echoed material 'She's happy' is, as it were, within quotation marks and so sealed off from the negation which lies outside the quote/echo.
The implicit echo of truth-conditional content?
I have tried to show in the previous section that a general characterisation of the class of metalinguistic negations is possible using the concept of implicit echoic use. However, the thought that immediately arises is that on an echoic analysis there is nothing to exclude the truth-conditional content of the material in the scope of negation being echoed (and objected to) and it is not clear that we want this possibility.
I have concentrated so far on NON-truth-conditional properties, mostly, in fact, on formal linguistic properties, following Horn and others. But the concept of echoic use applies more widely than this; in their work, Sperber and Wilson have given many examples where the speaker is not echoing an element of linguistic form but is echoing the content of someone's utterance or indeed is attributing a (possibly unarticulated) thought or opinion to someone. For instance, in the analysis of irony the echoic allusion primarily concerns descriptive content, as in the cases in (15).
Recall that Horn talks of metalinguistic negation as involving an objection to an utterance on any grounds whatever; now, disagreeing with the truth-conditional content is certainly a ground on which one might object to someone's utterance. Is it reasonable, then, to class the examples in (21) Certainly, (21a) and (21b) are not contradictory, unlike so many of the standardly cited examples. However, as I've argued above contradictoriness does not seem to be an essential property of metalinguistic (perhaps more aptly, metarepresentational) use. It is not clear to me whether we would want to say that Y in each case is objecting to the truth-conditional content of X's utterance or to something more formal like the use of a particular lexical item or phrase, which happens to make a truth-conditional difference. As for (21c) and (21d), they seem to conform to the formula that Horn and Burton-Roberts take to be typical of metalinguistic uses and they have the same sort of rhetorical effectiveness, perhaps involving some kind of garden-path. Again, it is far from clear whether it is truth-conditional content or lexis that is being objected to. Arguably, the birthday card example in (3) above involves the echo of descriptive content too, though not the content of an actual previous utterance. Rather, what is echoed there is the general assumption/expectation/hope that a birthday card that one receives will be from an admirer. This loosening of what is echoed from strictly formal linguistic properties of an utterance and, finally, from any actual previous utterance at all, is just as one would expect from the Sperber and Wilson account.
The reluctance to include truth-conditional content as a possible ground for objecting to someone's (actual or potential) utterance is that such echoic cases would seem then to be effectively indistinguishable from standard descriptive negations, which, of course, operate over truth-conditional content. However, there is an interesting parallel that can be drawn here, with another sort of echoic case, which is often virtually indistinguishable from its descriptive counterpart. This is the case where an attitude of endorsement is expressed towards implicitly echoed material. Sperber and Wilson (1986) discuss the following examples (their numbering):
(111) a.
Peter: It's a lovely day for a picnic.
[They go for a picnic and the sun shines.] b.
Mary (happily): It's a lovely day for a picnic, indeed.
(112) a. Peter: It's a lovely day for a picnic.
[They go for a picnic and it rains.] b.
Mary (sarcastically): It's a lovely day for a picnic, indeed.
"In both (111b) and (112b) there is an echoic allusion to be picked up. In the circumstance described, it is clear that the speaker of (111b) endorses the opinion echoed, whereas the speaker of (112b) rejects it with scorn. These utterances are interpreted on exactly similar patterns; the only difference is in the attitudes they express. (111b) has not been thought by rhetoricians to be worthy of special attention; (112b) is, of course, a case of verbal irony" (Sperber & Wilson 1986: 239) .
Unusually, it is the endorsement case (111b) that I am interested in here. Let's compare it (repeated in (22b)) with its non-echoic (i.e. descriptive) counterpart given in (22a):
It's a lovely day for a picnic. b.
It IS a lovely day for a picnic (indeed).
They look and sound pretty much the same, though, as I've attempted to indicate, there may be some superficial clues towards the echoic analysis, such as a particular accent pattern, and the use of the inessential 'indeed'. There will, presumably, be a difference in the communicative intention of the speaker in each case and slight differences in the effects achieved, or in the way in which they are achieved. The effects in the echoic case may well be focused on giving Peter a pat on the back for having got it right, for having exercised such good judgement, effects which might be less prominent in the case of the descriptive assertion that happens to be in agreement with Peter's earlier assertion. However, the difference between them will, in many instances, be pretty negligible and it won't matter much which interpretation the hearer derives. This lack of a particularly sharp interpretive difference in the case of endorsing echoes and their descriptive counterparts does not lead us to the conclusion that the distinction doesn't exist; that is, to the conclusion that echoic allusion with an attitude of corroboration is not a real possibility. What I am suggesting is that the same goes for cases of echoing the truth-conditional content of the representation in the scope of negation and their descriptive, non-echoic, counterparts. So B's response to A in (23) might be a case of echoic negation, the assertion that 'she's happy' being attributed to A, or it could be an ordinary descriptive use, a counter-assertion to A's assertion:
Mary seems happy these days. B:
She isn't HAPPY; she just puts on a brave face.
In the absence of any more specific context there is just no way of knowing. In context, the two possibilities may differ slightly in the effects they achieve or in the way those effects are achieved, the force of the dissociative attitude being stronger in the echoic case than in the descriptive case, though very often the upshot will be much the same. A small piece of evidence in favour of maintaining the distinction, despite its negligible effect on interpretation, comes from a consideration of the formal diagnostics of metalinguistic use, especially the presence of positive polarity items:
Mary is sometimes late. B1: She isn't ever late; she's always punctual. B2: She isn't sometimes late; she's always punctual.
The negative polarity item 'ever' in B1 would indicate descriptive use of the material in the scope of negation, while the positive polarity item 'sometimes' in B2 indicates that A's utterance is being echoed, and, as the follow-up clause shows, it is the truthconditional content of the utterance that is being objected to.
It seems then that a properly general account of cases of marked negation can be given in terms of implicit echoic use, an account which includes the rhetorically effective formulas that Horn and others have concentrated on but which is far from exhausted by them.
Let us return to the issue of the alleged ambiguity of negation, whether semantic or pragmatic. On the account I have just proposed there is no reason to suppose the negation operator is either semantically ambiguous or, if the term makes sense at all, pragmatically ambiguous. There IS a 'duality of use' involved in the metalinguistic examples, though it is not an ambiguity in the lexical item 'not'. It lies rather with the two ways in which material falling within the scope of 'not' can be used: either as representing a state of affairs in the world (i.e. descriptively) or as representing another representation (i.e. interpretively or echoicly). This particular duality of use is not in any way peculiar to negative utterances but is a thoroughly pervasive feature of language use. The negation operator itself is, in all instances, just the standard truth-functional operator.
The account does, of course, need a lot more fleshing out. I haven't yet addressed the issue of what proposition is expressed and recovered in the echoic cases; that is, of how (or, indeed, whether) the implicitly echoed/quoted material within the negation is pragmatically unpacked into an explicit representation by the hearer/reader. There is, in addition, a great need for some deeper understanding of where the metarepresentational use (of which echoic use is a subtype) of natural language comes from. Should it be thought of as a semantic ambiguity, or a pragmatic ambiguity, or something else altogether, a reflex in public language of a fundamental cognitive capacity perhaps? Is it a feature of the language faculty and, if so, does that entail that every sentence has various semantic representations with, as it were, quotation marks around certain constituents? If it is not a part of the grammar then how does it arise in interpretation? These questions are raised by the analysis of metalinguistic negation in terms of echoic use, though they are obviously not peculiar to it, since they are raised elsewhere too, by the quite general fact of the metarepresentational (interpretive) use of language. I don't suppose they are going to receive any swift or easy answers.
